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No. 24 MARCH 2021 Introduction 
Palestinian Elections, Finally 
Significance, Challenges and European Responsibilities 
Muriel Asseburg 
2021 is shaping up to be a year of elections for the Palestinians, both in the Palestinian 
Territories and across the world. Three ballots are scheduled for the institutions of 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). It 
is still unclear whether they will all take place as planned. The PA elections certainly 
have an important role to play in integrating the younger generations in the Terri-
tories, restoring political accountability and reinstating democratic checks and bal-
ances. The elections to the Palestinian National Council – the PLO’s parliament in 
exile – would be even more significant and a crucial step towards creating a repre-
sentative organ and establishing the basis for an inclusive discussion about the lib-
eration movement’s future strategy and the role of the PA. The EU and its member 
states have been calling for years for the Palestinian leadership to revive the demo-
cratic process and overcome the Fatah/Hamas split. They should therefore not only 
support the elections with observers but also contribute actively to their being as 
free, fair and competitive as possible under the difficult circumstances. 
 
In mid-January 2021 Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas issued decrees for three 
elections to be held in the course of the 
year: to the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(PLC), the PA’s parliament, on 22 May; 
for the PA presidency on 31 July; and to 
the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the 
PLO’s parliament in exile, on 31 August. 
The decision to hold elections fulfils the 
longstanding demand of the international 
community – especially Germany and its 
EU partners – to revive the democratic 
process in the Palestinian Territories. At 
the same time, Abbas hopes to prepare the 
ground to mend the relationship with the 
United States after four years of dysfunc-
tionality under President Donald Trump. 
The decision was made possible by a rap-
prochement between the Palestinian 
parties: first and foremost Fatah, which 
governs the West Bank, and Hamas, which 
governs in Gaza. The decisive motivation 
was their shared rejection of Trump’s so-
called deal of the century and the Israeli 
government’s announcement in early sum-
mer 2020 of a formal annexation of parts 
of the West Bank. In view of the existential 
threat to the Palestinian national project, 
the Palestinians agreed in autumn 2020 to 
hold elections at all levels before resuming 
talks towards reconciliation between the 
rival leaderships. The sequence acknowl-
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edged that one of the effects of the failure 
of all efforts to overcome the split had been 
to prevent the holding of elections. 
Elections Still Uncertain 
The Palestinian parties committed in early 
February 2021 to accept the election results, 
and agreed to secure the polling stations 
with official, uniformed security forces, 
and to establish a special election court 
(with judges from the West Bank, Gaza 
and East Jerusalem). They also agreed to 
establish a government of national unity, 
ensure freedom of expression and release 
political detainees on both sides. In mid-
March they signed a code of honour for 
the ballots. 
Preparations are already in full swing. 
President Abbas has issued decrees regu-
lating the process in the Palestinian Terri-
tories, including a purely proportional 
national list system for the PLC election. 
Voter registration was carried out in mid-
February. Registration of party lists is 
between 20 and 31 March. 
Yet it is by no means certain that all the 
elections will occur as planned. The third 
wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, which is 
currently virulent in the Palestinian Terri-
tories, is likely to hamper campaigning and 
voting. Nor is it clear whether the Palestin-
ian population of East Jerusalem will be 
permitted to participate, and if so how. 
Both dominant parties also worry about 
losing control of the part of the Territories 
they currently govern. Another fear is that 
a successful ballot could be followed by 
another round of international isolation 
and loss of urgently needed diplomatic and 
financial support – as occurred in 2006 
after Hamas won largely free and fair elec-
tions and formed a government. This gov-
ernment was quickly isolated by Israel, the 
EU and the United States and undermined 
by Fatah, in a process that spiralled into 
armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah, 
Hamas’s violent seizure of power in Gaza 
and the political split that still drags on 
today. The governments of Israel, Jordan 
and Egypt are already exerting pressure on 
the PA to delay the elections. 
Potential Significance 
Elections in the Palestinian Territories 
would of course occur under conditions 
of occupation and achieve no more than 
renewing the institutions of the Palestinian 
Authority, whose powers under the Oslo 
Agreements between Israel and the PLO 
are very limited indeed. The process would 
nevertheless be immensely significant. Elec-
tions would firstly give the very young popu-
lation of the Palestinian Territories an op-
portunity to participate in politics. About 
two-thirds of the population are under 29 
years old. Given that the last elections were 
more than fifteen years ago – for the presi-
dency in January 2005, to the PLC in Janu-
ary 2006 – that also means that about half 
of today’s electorate (those aged 18 to 33 
years) have never had an opportunity to 
vote. 
Secondly it would be a first step towards 
restoring political accountability and demo-
cratic checks and balances. Abbas has 
ruled by decree since declaring a state of 
emergency after the political split between 
the West Bank and Gaza in June 2007. In 
December 2018 he finally dissolved the 
PLC, with the effect of lifting the deputies’ 
immunity. In the meantime two parallel 
political systems have emerged in the West 
Bank and Gaza, both of which are governed 
in an increasingly authoritarian fashion. 
While there may be little prospect of over-
coming the split and achieving genuine 
reconciliation, elections could at least 
restore a counterweight to the executive, 
and the legislative council would likely 
push for an independent judiciary. 
Thirdly the elections offer an opportunity 
to revive the political debate, foster the 
emergence of new political forces and en-
gage society. At least in theory it would also 
present a chance to initiate an orderly suc-
cession to the presidency. Although the 
population is largely disillusioned about 
the PA’s institutions and the political par-
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ties, the enthusiasm for voter registration – 
with more than 93 percent of those eligible 
signing up – indicates strong interest in 
political participation. Surveys show three-
quarters of respondents supporting elections, 
and a lively debate about the elections is 
under way in the Territories and across the 
diaspora.  
Fourthly the elections to the PLC will 
determine one-third of the seats on the PNC 
(132 of 350), as Legislative Council deputies 
will automatically represent the Palestinian 
Territories in the exile parliament. 
Elections to the PNC 
In view of the grim outlook for the national 
Palestinian project, the PNC elections would 
be especially significant. A process of re-
newal would be crucial to make the PLO’s 
governing body representative and improve 
its effectiveness. The bloated National 
Council (with currently 765 members) last 
met in April/May 2018. Even if it is still 
nominally the PLO’s supreme decision-mak-
ing body, it has remained largely on the 
sidelines since the PA was established in 
1994 and took over functions of the PLO. 
One central reason for its loss of relevance 
is the concentration of powers enjoyed 
by Abbas, as PA president, PLO chairman, 
Fatah chairman and president of the State 
of Palestine. This excludes from the politi-
cal process 8.5 million Palestinians in Israel 
and the diaspora (compared to about 5.2 
million in the Palestinian Territories). Fur-
thermore, the balance of forces in the PLO 
institutions is defined by factional com-
promises negotiated long ago and outdated 
quotas for unions and societal groups. 
Now the size of the PNC is to be reduced 
to 350 members and its composition deter-
mined wherever possible by elections. Even 
if the specific circumstances might not 
allow voting to take place in every country 
with a Palestinian community, and elec-
tions may end up being possible only in the 
Palestinian Territories, Israel, Europe, the 
United States and South America – they 
would still mark a decisive step towards 
establishing a representative organ and 
integrating forces like Hamas into the PLO 
in proportion to their popularity. That 
would also create the basis for an urgently 
needed Palestinian debate about the future 
strategy of the liberation movement and 
the role of the PA. 
Caveats 
There are currently strong signs that the 
two dominant forces – Fatah and Hamas – 
are seeking exclusive power-sharing rather 
than free, fair and competitive elections. It 
remains unclear whether the two parties 
will actually – as has been discussed – 
stand on a joint list and thus negotiate the 
share of seats between them in advance, 
rather than leaving that to the voters. 
There is also still doubt as to whether they 
will agree on a joint candidate for the presi-
dency – as Hamas in particular would 
wish. Hamas has thus made it clear that it 
does not intend to stand its own candidate 
for president. 
In general, conditions have been created 
that narrow the field and deter rather than 
encourage candidates from standing. The 
window for registration is so short as to 
make it almost impossible to form new 
alliances or conduct primaries. Also there is 
no party law that would regulate the estab-
lishment and registration of new parties 
beyond mere electoral alliances. Moreover, 
the lists have to collect three thousand 
signatures and deposit the equivalent of 
US$20,000 – a huge sum in the Palestinian 
context – to register. Before they register 
candidates are also required to resign from 
any public office they hold (whether as 
minister or local councillor) and terminate 
any employment in the public sector or 
even with civil society organisations. The 
minimum age for standing for the PLC was 
set at 28 years, provoking harsh criticism 
especially among the Palestinian youth. 
Neither Ramallah nor Gaza has fully im-
plemented the agreed release of political 
prisoners. And there is no sign of a political 
opening. Quite the contrary, in early March 
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Abbas issued a decree on NGOs placing con-
siderable constraints on the freedom of civil 
society. 
To date only Hamas has held internal 
elections – to schedule and therefore more 
or less coincidentally in advance of the elec-
tions. In the case of Fatah we currently see 
the opposite of an internal process involv-
ing the grassroots: The leadership assigns 
list places, excludes popular candidates 
and, according to media reports, threatens 
those who intend to stand on alternative 
lists with exclusion from the party or even 
physical violence. When Nasser al-Qidwa, 
member of Fatah’s central committee, long-
serving PLO representative to the United 
Nations and former PA foreign minister 
refused to bow to the pressure he was 
actually expelled from the party in mid-
March. There is every sign that Abbas in-
tends to stand again for president in July 
despite his advanced age of 85 years, his 
poor health and his repeated promises that 
he would not do so. He certainly wants to 
prevent adversaries within his own party 
from standing. This concerns two individu-
als in particular: Marwan Barghuthi, former 
PLC deputy and former secretary-general 
of Fatah in the West Bank, who has been 
imprisoned in Israel since 2002 and is cur-
rently regarded as the most popular Pales-
tinian politician; and Mohammed Dahlan, 
former head of the Preventive Security 
Force in Gaza, who was expelled from Fatah 
and has been in exile in the United Arab 
Emirates since 2012. 
Israel’s Role 
Orderly elections are also endangered by 
Israeli measures. Not only have Israeli secu-
rity forces in the West Bank begun detain-
ing members of the PFLP (Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine) and Hamas and 
pressuring them not to stand in the elec-
tions. Israel also has yet to clarify whether 
and how the Palestinian population of East 
Jerusalem will be permitted to participate 
in the elections, as explicitly laid out in the 
Oslo Agreements. In the past some voted in 
a kind of postal vote in the city’s post 
offices, others in Palestinian West Bank 
communities adjacent to Jerusalem. With 
good will on both sides ways and means 
could certainly be found to allow East 
Jerusalem’s Palestinian population to par-
ticipate. And then there is the question 
of enabling residents of East Jerusalem to 
stand as candidates. That would require a 
clear commitment from the Israeli govern-
ment not to strip them of their residency 
rights in the city – as occurred after the 
2006 PLC elections when four Jerusalem-
based Hamas deputies were detained and 
expelled from the city. 
European Demands, European 
Responsibility 
The EU and its member states – as the 
largest donor to the Palestinians – have 
declared that they want to contribute to 
building a democratic Palestinian entity. 
For years they have been calling on the 
Palestinian leadership to return to the 
democratic process and overcome the split. 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is said 
to have urged President Abbas to hold elec-
tions at their last meeting in August 2019. 
The EU and its member states should 
therefore not only – as already planned – 
support the upcoming ballots with (finan-
cial) assistance and observers. They should 
also – if possible united and in coordina-
tion with Washington, but if need be in a 
coalition of the willing – firstly press the 
Palestinian leadership to refrain from yet 
again indefinitely postponing the elections. 
They should also prevail upon the PA to 
rapidly create an atmosphere in which free, 
fair and competitive elections can take 
place – to the extent that is possible at all 
under the occupation. In order to facilitate 
the PNC election in late summer they should 
enable the Palestinian diaspora in Europe 
to campaign and vote, for example by pro-
viding polling stations and logistical sup-
port. 
Secondly they should push Israel to allow 
the Palestinian population of East Jerusa-
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lem to vote – and to stand for election – 
without restrictions, to grant the freedom 
of movement within and between the 
Palestinian Territories required for cam-
paigning and voting, and to desist from 
intervening in the electoral process. 
Thirdly they should now send a clear 
message about the conditions under which 
they would cooperate with the government 
of national unity sought by the dominant 
parties, rather than waiting to see what 
outcome the election brings. There is a 
need to allay fears that a Western policy 
of isolation would yet again more or less 
automatically be imposed on any govern-
ment in which Hamas were involved. 
Hamas has backed the agreement among 
the Palestinian parties that forms the basis 
for the elections, whose existence the PA 
confirmed in a letter to the US State Depart-
ment. It contains a commitment to a two-
state settlement based on the 1967 borders, 
to international law, (unarmed) popular 
resistance, and recognition of the PLO as 
sole representative of the Palestinians 
worldwide. The European Union and its 
member states should announce that they 
are willing to cooperate with a unity gov-
ernment operating on the basis of this plat-
form. That would also serve to strengthen 
the pragmatic wing of Hamas, which has 
come ever closer to accepting the condi-
tions for cooperation laid down in 2006 by 
the so-called Middle East Quartet (United 
States, Russian Federation, United Nations, 
European Union), i.e. commitment to non-
violence, recognition of Israel, and accept-
ance of previous agreements and obliga-
tions, but is only ready to recognise Israel 
in the context of an agreement and not as 
a precondition.  
Even if Hamas is still on the European 
Union’s list of terrorist organizations, it 
would be sensible for the EU and its mem-
ber states to reconsider their “no contact 
policy” towards Hamas. It would make 
sense to initiate at least low-level contacts 
in order to explore further steps towards 
rapprochment and to feed European posi-
tions (for example in relation to Israel, gov-
ernance and human rights) into Hamas’s 
policy debates and positions. 
Dr. Muriel Asseburg is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Research Division. 
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